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TINKER GONE VIRAL:  DIVERGING THRESHOLD 
TESTS FOR ANALYZING SCHOOL REGULATION 
OF OFF-CAMPUS DIGITAL STUDENT SPEECH 
Daniel Marcus-Toll* 
 
In the context of students’ free speech rights, courts have traditionally 
premised school regulatory authority on geography, deferring to school 
officials on campus and limiting a school’s capacity to discipline students 
for conduct taking place beyond school hours or property.  In the 
contemporary setting, however, where wireless devices, mobile phones, and 
other communicative technologies abound, a student may affect the school 
environment significantly without setting foot on school property.  In the 
absence of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, the limits of school 
authority to regulate such “off-campus” student speech are uncertain. 
Several courts have permitted school discipline in response to off-campus 
student speech under the “substantial disruption” test developed by the 
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District.  Responding to distinct situations, these courts have fashioned 
separate threshold tests to determine whether to apply the substantial 
disruption test to off-campus student speech.  These threshold tests are 
inconsistent and risk either overly burdening students’ First Amendment 
rights or undermining a school’s ability to carry out its educational 
mission. 
This Note argues that the threshold tests that courts have developed 
neither safeguard the rights of students nor meet the needs of schools 
adequately.  By permitting schools to regulate off-campus student speech 
that may foreseeably reach school property or which bears a sufficient 
nexus to a school’s pedagogical interests, the Second and Fourth Circuit’s 
threshold tests fail to impose a meaningful limit on the kind or amount of 
speech that schools may regulate.  On the other hand, by adopting a stricter 
threshold test based on identifiable threats of school violence, the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard may foreclose a school’s ability to protect students from 
other dangers.  By instead redefining “substantial disruption” in 
accordance with the conception of student-on-student harassment that the 
Supreme Court has articulated in the Title IX context, courts might better 
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serve schools’ regulatory interests while protecting students’ First 
Amendment rights in the digital age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Online threats by students are cause for serious concern in today’s 
schools.1  For example, Landon, a tenth grader in Nevada, engaged in 
instant-messaging conversations with several classmates after school hours 
and from home.2  Over several months, Landon’s friends became disturbed 
by the content of his messages.3  Increasingly violent and indicative of his 
access to weapons and hundreds of rounds of ammunition, Landon’s 
messages focused on a school shooting that he seemed to be planning.4  
Concerned, his classmates brought the messages to the attention of their 
principal.5  The school initially suspended and then expelled Landon for 
ninety days because of the online messages that he sent from his home.6 
Schools are also increasingly vigilant about instances of cyberbullying.7  
Kara, a West Virginia high school senior, created a discussion group on a 
social networking website from her home computer and invited dozens of 
her classmates to join.8  The commentary on the website focused on 
disparaging Shay, a classmate.9  Another student posted several 
photographs to the website, one of which showed him holding a sign 
reading “Shay Has Herpes,” as well as another of Shay herself, upon which 
 
 1. See Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 2. See id. at 1065. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. at 1065–66. 
 5. See id. at 1066. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
2010, at A1.  Although “cyberbullying” may be an “imprecise label” for a “phenomenon 
[that] is hard to quantify,” this Note adopts as a definition “willful and repeated harm” 
inflicted through phones, computers, and other electronic methods. Id. 
 8. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 9. See id. at 568. 
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the student wrote the caption “portrait of a whore.”10  After Shay’s parents 
filed a harassment complaint with school officials, the school suspended 
Kara for ten days and prohibited her from participating in extracurricular 
activities.11 
In some instances, schools have also reacted to students’ online activity 
to protect school officials.12  For example, J.S., an eighth-grade student 
from Pennsylvania, created a fake profile of her principal on MySpace.13  
Although the profile did not identify the principal by name, it did feature 
his official photograph from the school district’s website.14  The profile 
derided the principal’s family and implied that he was a pedophile.15  
Although J.S. limited access to the profile by making it “private,” the 
principal nevertheless discovered it through conversations with another 
student.16  The school suspended J.S. for ten days.17 
Finally, schools have, in some instances, sought to limit student conduct 
that simply reflects poorly on the school.18  During the summer before T.V. 
entered tenth grade in Indiana, she and her friends photographed each other 
in various sexually provocative poses and states of undress.19  T.V. posted 
some of the pictures to her MySpace and Facebook accounts, where access 
was limited to those with “friend” status.20  T.V. contended that she and her 
friends, athletes on the school’s volleyball team, took the photographs in 
jest.21  When the school’s principal learned of the photographs from another 
student’s parent, however, T.V. was suspended from extracurricular 
activities, including volleyball games.22 
The above examples sketch variations on a similar theme:  student 
speech23 that occurs in the off-campus context, which, due to its connection 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 568–69; see also J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 
F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098–99  (C.D. Cal. 2010) (involving a student suspended for posting a 
video of her friends on YouTube using vulgar language to insult a classmate). 
 12. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc); see also Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 13. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. at 921. 
 17. See id. at 922; see also Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 
(N.D. Miss. 2012) (involving a student suspended for recording and posting a rap song 
featuring vulgar and threatening language against two school coaches on Facebook and 
YouTube). 
 18. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 773 
(N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 19. See id. at 771–72. 
 20. See id. at 772. 
 21. See id. at 771–72. 
 22. See id. at 772–74.  Pursuant to school policy, T.V. was suspended for “bringing 
discredit on [herself] and the school.” Id. at 774. 
 23. For purposes of this Note, “student speech” or “student expression” refers to a broad 
concept that encompasses speech, press and other literature distribution, expressive 
communication, and cyber communication (including blog and social networking website 
posts, email, instant messages, and text messages). See R. CHACE RAMEY, STUDENT FIRST 
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to the school community, generates a strong school interest in regulation.  It 
is uncertain, however, whether and when schools may lawfully restrict 
speech by students that occurs “off campus.”24  Notwithstanding the fact 
that off-campus student expression can and often does have an effect on 
school premises, the U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly held that 
schools may regulate student speech that originates or takes place beyond 
the “schoolhouse gate.”25 
Until recent cases questioned the wisdom of the “schoolhouse gate” 
boundary, school regulatory authority had traditionally been drawn along 
geographical lines.26  Although students do not forfeit their constitutional 
rights upon entering school property,27 it is clear that they do not enjoy 
parallel liberties to citizens in other settings.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court has granted public school officials considerable authority to regulate 
student expression within the school community.28  Indeed, school officials 
may prohibit many forms of student expression that would otherwise 
generally be protected by the First Amendment.29  School authority to 
 
AMENDMENT SPEECH AND EXPRESSION RIGHTS 1–2 n.1 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2011).  As 
used here, “digital speech” refers to a realm within “student speech” that includes 
communication via the internet and mobile phones. 
 24. See Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 2013, at A1; see also Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability of its 
student-speech jurisprudence to off-campus speech).  For purposes of this Note, “off-
campus” student speech encompasses speech that “does not take place in a classroom or at a 
school activity,” or pursuant to a school assignment. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the 
First Amendment:  A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 407 n.92 (2011).  For 
an argument that the Court should provide school officials with a definitive standard for off-
campus student speech, see David L. Hudson, Jr., Time for the Supreme Court To Address 
Off-Campus, Online Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621 (2012). 
 25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 26. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1090 (2008) (“[M]any courts facing a student speech case ask as a threshold 
matter whether the speech can be considered on-campus or off-campus expression.”); see 
also infra Part I.D. 
 27. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. But see C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, 
When Students Speak:  Judicial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 343, 343–44 (1989) (arguing that “the principle of freedom of speech is . . . of doubtful 
applicability” in the context of public schools); Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be 
“Free Speech” in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 59 (2008) (“[W]e all do 
well to remain skeptical about the compatibility of government-run education with the 
freedom of speech.”). 
 28. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (allowing school regulation of 
speech advocating illegal drugs); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 
(1988) (permitting school regulation of school-sponsored speech); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (allowing school regulation of vulgar or lewd speech); 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (permitting school regulation of speech causing a substantial 
disruption of school activities). 
 29. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates:  What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 529 (2000) [hereinafter 
Chemerinsky, What’s Left of Tinker?] (arguing that the Court’s deferential approach to 
decisions by public school officials concerning students’ constitutional rights resembles its 
approach to similar decisions by prison and military officials); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441 (1999). 
3400 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
regulate student speech is typically justified based on the “special 
characteristics”30 of the school environment and the unique role of public 
schools in developing the nation’s youth.31  Courts and commentators have 
proposed various theories to explain why students’ constitutional rights are 
diminished while on school property or under school supervision.32  As a 
general matter, however, there is much support for the notion that students 
enjoy more complete constitutional rights outside of school.33 
Modern issues, such as the threat of mass violence in schools, 
cyberbullying,34 and widespread youth access to telecommunications and 
recording devices,35 have led schools to test the limits of their regulatory 
authority.36  State legislatures have begun to respond to some of these 
problems by enacting cyberbullying statutes, for example.37  Not every state 
has acted,38 however, and the prospect that such statutes will 
comprehensively address the sundry and multiplying situations that a school 
may confront is unlikely. 
The “substantial disruption” standard developed by the Supreme Court in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District39 has 
emerged as the preferred mode of analysis to determine whether public 
 
 30. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 31. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (“A school need not tolerate student speech 
that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission’ . . . .” (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
685)); see also James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1340 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court is willing to limit students’ constitutional 
rights for the specific purpose of protecting a school’s academic function). 
 32. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1071–89 (summarizing and analyzing justifications 
for limiting students’ First Amendment rights); see also Ryan, supra note 31, at 1340.  For 
an argument that student speech rights have no basis in the Constitution, see Morse, 551 U.S. 
at 416–22 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 33. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 410 (“The Court has repeatedly indicated that off-
campus speech receives greater protection than on-campus speech.”); Ryan, supra note 31, 
at 1338 (“Student [free speech rights] are more limited in the school setting than they are 
outside of that setting.”); see also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 
F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979) (“When school officials are authorized only to punish speech 
on school property, the student is free to speak his mind when the school day ends.”). 
 34. See Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2013, at A1. 
 35. See Editorial, The On-Campus Effect of Off-Campus Threats, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2013, at A14, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/06/opinion/la-ed-student-
speech-9th-circuit-court-20130906 (“[I]t’s now possible for a student to disrupt the learning 
environment by pecking out threats on his home computer or on the telephone he carries on 
the school bus.”). 
 36. See Sengupta, supra note 24. 
 37. See generally Matthew Fenn, Note, A Web of Liability:  Does New Cyberbullying 
Legislation Put Public Schools in a Sticky Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729 (2013). 
 38. See id. at 2753–55 (noting that not all states have passed cyberbullying legislation 
and that there is substantial variance among the cyberbullying statutes that states have 
enacted); Cyberbullying, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
education/cyberbullying.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (providing a summary of state 
cyberbullying laws). 
 39. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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schools may regulate off-campus student speech.40  Under that standard, if 
student speech causes a substantial disruption to school activities, or if 
school officials could reasonably predict such a disruption, then the speech 
may be banned.41  However, in light of Tinker’s traditional application in 
the on-campus setting,42 and in the absence of clear guidance from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts have developed several threshold standards 
for determining the circumstances under which the Tinker standard may 
permit school regulation of off-campus student speech.  These approaches 
are not necessarily consistent and have inspired a considerable amount of 
commentary.43 
This Note examines the separate threshold tests that lower courts have 
developed and applied to determine whether to extend Tinker’s substantial 
disruption standard to student speech that occurs in off-campus settings.44  
Part I examines the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, how the 
Supreme Court has adapted student free speech rights in light of the 
“special characteristics” of the school environment,45 and how modern 
realities have posed novel difficulties with respect to schools’ and courts’ 
approaches to regulating student speech.  Part II looks at the approaches of 
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, respectively, regarding a 
threshold test for applying Tinker to off-campus student speech.  Part III 
analyzes the efficacy of the threshold tests and argues that, in place of a 
threshold test, redefining “substantial disruption” in the context of off-
campus student speech is a more apt solution for preserving students’ rights 
while enabling schools to regulate effectively. 
I.  SPEECH AND SCHOOLS:  REGULATION BASED ON THE SPECIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT 
This Part considers free speech rights generally and the more 
circumscribed speech rights that schools and courts accord students.  Part 
I.A provides a summary of the Free Speech Clause, its underlying 
rationales, and ways in which the state may regulate speech.  Part I.B 
 
 40. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 
2013); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–75 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); see also infra Part II. 
 41. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 513–14. 
 42. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 
(2d Cir. 1979) (finding Tinker inapplicable where a school suspended several students who 
wrote, edited, and distributed an independent newspaper outside the school). 
 43. See, e.g., Jessica K. Boyd, Note, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to 
Cyberspace:  How Much Protection Is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded Under the First 
Amendment?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1215 (2013); Nathan S. Fronk, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff:  
An Example of Public Schools’ Paternalism and the Off-Campus Restriction of Students’ 
First Amendment Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417 (2010); Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The 
Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate:  The Fate of Tinker in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 
CATH. U. L. REV. 895 (2012). 
 44. The scope of this Note is limited to speech by primary and secondary public school 
students.  “Private schools, by definition, are not government run and, therefore, are not 
subject to the demands of the First Amendment.” Goldman, supra note 24, at 397 n.7. 
 45. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
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examines the Supreme Court’s landmark Tinker decision, which established 
the substantial disruption standard.  Part I.C looks at the Court’s subsequent 
jurisprudence, which, in adopting an attitude of deference to school 
officials, permits greater regulatory authority over student speech.  Part I.D 
analyzes the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy and explains the difficulties 
that lie in attempting to apply it to digital speech. 
A.  Freedom of Speech:  An Overview 
This section first looks at the scope of the Free Speech Clause and the 
rationales that support it.  This section then focuses on speech restrictions 
and examines the distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
regulations. 
1.  Defining and Justifying Freedom of Speech 
Under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”46  By its express terms, 
the First Amendment therefore prohibits government actors from impairing 
the free speech rights of the public.47  The First Amendment applies not 
only to the federal government, but also, through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to state government actors.48  Protected 
expression under the First Amendment is not limited to oral speech, but 
includes conduct imbued with communicative elements.49  Thus, an 
individual who burns an American flag50 or wears a black armband51 as a 
form of symbolic expression engages in an activity protected by the First 
Amendment. 
Courts and commentators have advanced numerous theories to explain 
and justify the uniquely robust free speech doctrine in American 
jurisprudence.52  A popular metaphor for broad free speech rights invokes 
the abstract “marketplace of ideas” in which all individuals may 
participate.53  Under the “marketplace” theory, the First Amendment serves 
as a vehicle for personal and societal enlightenment—through the 
competition of each and every idea, the best ones will necessarily emerge, 
 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 47. See id.; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (“As a 
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or 
read or speak or hear.”). 
 48. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
 51. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 52. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech:  The United States 
Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377, 379 (arguing that because the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment expansively, the “constitutional 
protection afforded to freedom of speech in the United States is seemingly unparalleled 
anywhere else in the world”). 
 53. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2:3–:4 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
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and the truth will be discovered.54  Alternatively, the “human dignity and 
self-fulfillment theory” of the First Amendment emphasizes the rights of 
the individual.55  Under this theory, free speech is essential because it 
protects an individual’s rights to self-expression, personhood, and 
autonomy.56  In contrast, the “democratic self-governance” theory values 
freedom of speech primarily for its importance to democracy.57  Thus, 
freedom of speech is essential for democratic government because it is the 
vehicle through which citizens debate social policies and elect 
representatives.58 
2.  Limiting Free Speech:  Content-Based  
and Content-Neutral Regulations 
Despite its unequivocal language, the First Amendment does not 
establish absolute freedom of speech.59  Laws restricting speech are usually 
grouped into two classes of regulations:  content-based and content-
neutral.60 
A content-based speech regulation is based expressly on the speaker’s 
actual message.61  The controlling consideration is the government’s 
purpose in adopting the regulation.62  As a general matter, content-based 
regulations are presumptively unconstitutional.63  Content-based regulation 
is subject to strict scrutiny judicial review.64  While the class of content-
 
 54. See id. § 2:4; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market . . . .”). 
 55. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 53, § 2:5. 
 56. See id.; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (“The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of 
the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.  Such expression is an integral part 
of the development of ideas and a sense of identity.  To suppress expression is to reject the 
basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.”). 
 57. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 53, § 2:6. 
 58. See id.; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“‘[S]peech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’” 
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964))). 
 59. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections afforded by the 
First Amendment, however, are not absolute . . . .”). 
 60. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189 (1983) (noting that the distinction between content-based 
and content-neutral restrictions is the most “pervasively employed doctrine in the 
jurisprudence of free expression”). 
 61. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994) (“As a general 
rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis 
of the ideas or views expressed are content based.”). 
 62. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 63. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (“‘[T]he First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002))); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is axiomatic 
that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message 
it conveys.”). 
 64. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 53, § 4:2; see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 642 (“Our 
precedents . . . apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or 
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based regulations includes blanket subject-matter restrictions,65 the 
Supreme Court has identified several categories of speech that receive 
either diminished or virtually no protection under the First Amendment.66  
In contrast, the Court vigorously protects “political speech.”67  Thus, courts 
may inquire into the “value” of the speech when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a particular content-based regulation.68  Viewpoint 
discrimination, which prohibits or constrains expression by particular 
speakers, especially offends the First Amendment and is unlikely to survive 
judicial review.69 
Content-neutral restrictions, in contrast, limit expression ostensibly 
without regard for the speaker’s message.70  For example, a “time, place, or 
manner” regulation that imposes reasonable limits on speech rights without 
regard to the message may reduce the total quantity of expression as much 
or more than a content-based regulation,71 but may nevertheless be upheld 
as a legitimate content-neutral restriction.72  Content-neutral regulations, 
compared to content-based restrictions, raise fewer First Amendment 
 
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”).  A court will uphold a 
content-based regulation under the strict scrutiny standard only if the regulation is justified 
by a compelling governmental interest and the regulation is tailored narrowly to achieve that 
interest. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 53, § 4:2.  Applying the strict scrutiny standard of review 
to content-based regulations is “almost always fatal.” Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the 
Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 595, 596 (2003). 
 65. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) 
(“The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibition of 
public discussion of an entire topic.”). 
 66. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (child pornography); 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) 
(commercial speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 
(1969) (true threats); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (defamation); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“fighting” words). 
 67. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech . . . is ‘at the 
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 365 (2003))). 
 68. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 421 (“While valuing speech may be inconsistent 
with First Amendment theory, the Court often has considered whether a regulation affects 
‘core’ First Amendment speech or low-value speech that offers little contribution to the 
‘marketplace of ideas.’”). 
 69. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content discrimination.”); Jacobs, 
supra note 64, at 600 (“Viewpoint discrimination by the government is the primary free 
speech clause danger.”). 
 70. See Stone, supra note 60, at 189–90 (listing examples of content-neutral restrictions, 
including laws that ban billboards in residential communities or that impose license fees for 
parades).  For a discussion of content neutrality and speech restrictions, see Steven J. 
Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy:  Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647 (2002). 
 71. See Stone, supra note 60, at 193. 
 72. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding a 
content-neutral city sound-amplification guideline as a reasonable place and manner 
regulation of expression). 
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concerns73 and therefore typically receive an intermediate level of scrutiny 
from reviewing courts.74  Typically, a regulation is viewed as neutral, even 
if it has an incidental effect on some speakers and not others, when it serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of the expression.75 
Private parties affected by government restrictions on speech may 
challenge those restrictions on constitutional grounds.76  Such restrictions 
may be challenged either facially or as applied.77  Moreover, such 
regulations also may be challenged for vagueness.78 
B.  A Bulwark Against Totalitarian Schools:  The Tinker Test 
This section analyzes Tinker, where the Court established that public 
school students enjoy constitutionally protected rights to expression.79  This 
section first examines the majority opinion, which offered considerable 
protection to students’ First Amendment rights and articulated the standard 
under which a school may justifiably curtail them.  This section then looks 
at Justice Hugo Black’s dissenting opinion, which advocated a posture of 
deference to school officials that influenced subsequent student speech 
cases.  Finally, this section briefly explores the substantial disruption 
standard, which lower courts have not interpreted in a consistent fashion. 
 
 
 73. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 420–21. 
 74. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–803.  To survive intermediate scrutiny, a challenged 
content-neutral regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest and leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. See id. at 803. 
 75. See id. at 791. 
 76. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678–79 (1986) 
(evaluating a student’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge to his suspension for violating a school 
rule against obscene speech). 
 77. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473–74 & n.3 (2010).  In a typical facial 
challenge, a plaintiff seeks to have a statute declared unconstitutional in all possible 
applications. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 915, 923 (2011).  In an as-applied challenge, a plaintiff seeks to have a statute 
declared unconstitutional in particular, or fewer than all, applications. See id. at 923–24.  In 
the First Amendment context, however, the Court will recognize an alternative kind of facial 
challenge whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “‘a substantial number of its 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep.’” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). 
 78. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (finding that 
a regulation is vague when it “‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement,’” and further finding that vagueness is of particular concern 
when speech is involved (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008))); see 
also 1 SMOLLA, supra note 53, § 6:14. 
 79. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–13 (1969). 
3406 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
1.  The Tinker Majority 
Tinker is a landmark case and is among the Supreme Court’s most 
important decisions in the context of the constitutional rights of students.80  
Tinker announced a broad conception of a student’s rights, one from which 
the Court has retreated in its subsequent jurisprudence.81  Significantly, 
Tinker held that students enjoy constitutional rights and first enunciated the 
“substantial disruption” standard that public school officials must meet to 
regulate student speech.82 
In December 1965, John Tinker, his sister Mary Beth, and Christopher 
Eckhardt wore black armbands to school to demonstrate their objection to 
the Vietnam War.83  School officials, wary of potential protests in school, 
had just days before adopted a policy that barred students from wearing 
armbands.84  Any student who violated the policy risked suspension.85  
After John, Mary Beth, and Christopher each were sent home and 
suspended for wearing armbands, the Tinkers sued the school district, 
alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights.86 
Famously declaring that students do not abandon their right to freedom of 
speech at the “schoolhouse gate,” the Court found in favor of the Tinkers.87  
The Court first held that students possess fundamental constitutional rights 
that the State must respect.88  The Court also found no evidence 
demonstrating that the Tinkers’ armbands caused interference or disorder 
with school activities or the rights of others.89  Accordingly, the Court held 
that their expression, even (or perhaps especially) on a matter of political 
 
 80. See Chemerinsky, What’s Left of Tinker?, supra note 29, at 527.  At least one 
commentator views West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943), as the first true student-speech case decided by the Court. See Ryan, supra note 31, 
at 1346.  In Barnette, the Court struck down a statute that required students to salute the flag. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.  According to the Barnette Court, “That [schools] are educating 
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of 
the individual.” Id. at 637.  For purposes of this Note, Barnette does not have great salience, 
because it dealt with the issue of when a school may compel student speech, not restrain it. 
 81. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1045 (“[T]he Court has retreated from its broad 
protection of student speech rights in Barnette and Tinker and has instead become 
increasingly deferential to school officials who punish students for their expressive 
activities.”). 
 82. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; see also Chemerinsky, What’s Left of Tinker?, supra 
note 29, at 545 (commenting on the significance of the principles enunciated in Tinker and 
the substantial disruption standard).  For an argument advocating abandonment of Tinker, 
see R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2014). 
 83. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. at 506. 
 88. See id. at 511. 
 89. See id. at 508 (“There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, 
actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to 
be secure and to be let alone.”). 
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controversy, was entitled to protection under the First Amendment.90  The 
prohibition was unconstitutional, moreover, because the school had 
wrongfully prohibited expression of a particular viewpoint.91 
Crucially, however, while schools do not possess “absolute authority” 
over their students under Tinker, neither do students enjoy an absolute right 
to constitutionally protected expression.92  Indeed, the Court also held that 
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.93 
Thus, under Tinker, a school may restrict student speech or expression that 
would either “‘materially and substantially interfer[e]’”94 with the operation 
of the school or “collid[e] with” the rights of other students.95  Moreover, 
although the Tinker Court found no evidence of any actual substantial 
disturbance, the language of the majority opinion contemplates proper 
school regulation of student speech in anticipation of a significant 
disruption.96  An “undifferentiated fear” or “apprehension of disturbance,” 
however, is not sufficient to overcome a student’s First Amendment 
rights.97 
Tinker’s wording is arguably broad enough to support its application in 
the off-campus setting.98  The Tinker Court, however, did not expressly 
 
 90. See id. at 514.  Although the Court in its subsequent student-speech jurisprudence 
established several exceptions to Tinker, it does not appear to have limited Tinker’s holding 
to political speech only, nor have lower courts interpreted it so narrowly. See, e.g., Chandler 
v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (discerning three distinct areas 
of student speech from the Supreme Court’s precedents:  (1) vulgar or lewd speech, which is 
governed by Fraser; (2) school-sponsored speech, which is governed by Kuhlmeier; and (3) 
“all other speech,” which is governed by Tinker); Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse 
Quartet:  Student Speech and the First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 383 (2007) 
(arguing that the Court’s “baseline assumption is that—unless challenged student speech 
falls within the Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse exceptions—all student speech that otherwise 
may not be permissibly regulated is protected by Tinker’s test regardless of its political 
content”). 
 91. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510–11. 
 92. See id. at 511. 
 93. Id. at 513. 
 94. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 509 (“[O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence 
that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.” (emphasis added)).  Later, the Court added that the record failed to demonstrate 
“any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities.” Id. at 514 (emphasis added).  
Lower courts have embraced this application of the Tinker standard. See, e.g., LaVine v. 
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Tinker does not require school 
officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”). 
 97. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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contemplate that possibility.99  Rather, the Court justified school authority 
to regulate student speech based on the “special characteristics” of the 
school environment and the role of school officials to control student 
conduct.100  Accordingly, while students enjoy free speech rights in the 
classroom, cafeteria, playing field, or on campus during authorized hours, 
school officials may regulate student expression in those areas if it causes 
substantial disruption.101 
2.  The Tinker Dissent:  Deference to School Officials 
In an influential dissent,102 Justice Black argued for a contrasting model 
of students’ First Amendment rights based on deference to the expertise of 
school officials in regulating speech.103  As a preliminary matter, Justice 
Black viewed John Tinker’s expression as considerably more incendiary.104  
Justice Black proceeded to argue that courts should defer to school officials 
in determining and administering appropriate discipline.105  In Justice 
Black’s view, increased First Amendment rights for students and decreased 
deference to school officials necessarily diminished discipline, thereby 
corroding the public school system.106  Indeed, to Justice Black, the Tinker 
majority’s rule essentially ceded control of public education to students.107  
Unwilling to join the majority in undermining the mission of public 
schools, namely, “to give students an opportunity to learn, not to talk 




 99. Numerous commentators have argued against a broad reading of Tinker that enables 
schools to regulate off-campus student speech. See Fronk, supra note 43, at 1420 n.21 
(identifying commentators who argue that courts should apply Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard only to on-campus student speech). 
 100. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07. 
 101. See id. at 512–13. 
 102. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 n.4 (1988) (quoting 
Justice Black’s Tinker dissent); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 
(1986) (same); see also Chemerinsky, What’s Left of Tinker?, supra note 29, at 535 
(“Supreme Court rulings subsequent to Tinker have almost all sided with school officials and 
appear to have followed an approach much closer to Justice Black’s than the majority.”). 
 103. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524–26 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 104. See id. at 524 (“[T]he disputes over the wisdom of the Vietnam [W]ar have disrupted 
and divided this country as few other issues ever have.  Of course students . . . cannot 
concentrate on lesser issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their 
presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war . . . .”). 
 105. See id. (“Here the Court should accord Iowa educational institutions the . . . right to 
determine for themselves to what extent free expression should be allowed in its 
schools . . . .”). 
 106. See id. at 524–25. 
 107. See id. at 525–26. 
 108. See id. at 523–24. 
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3.  What Speech Constitutes a Substantial Disruption? 
The Tinker Court, in theory, articulated two separate prongs for 
regulating student speech:  substantial interference with the work of the 
school or impingement upon the rights of other students.109  The great 
weight of subsequent lower court school-speech jurisprudence, however, 
has been based on Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.110  Courts have 
rarely invoked the “rights of others” prong to evaluate the merits of a 
school’s disciplinary decision.111 
In light of the context of the Vietnam War, the Tinker Court arguably 
established a moderately high threshold in finding that the students’ 
armbands did not cause a substantial disruption.112  Additionally, the Court 
made clear that a school’s mere “undifferentiated fear” would not amount to 
a substantial disruption or a reasonable prediction of one.113  The Court, 
however, did not offer much guidance on defining “substantial 
disruption.”114  Consequently, lower courts have experienced some 
difficulty in applying the standard consistently.115  Given the vagueness of 
the phrase, moreover, predictions of what will constitute a substantial 
disruption are also likely variable and inconsistent.116 
C.  Less Speech, More Regulation:   
The Supreme Court’s Post-Tinker Jurisprudence 
The previous section addressed the Supreme Court’s Tinker decision and 
its broad pronouncement of student-speech rights.  This section examines 
the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence, in which it has retreated from that 
position and deferred considerably to school officials acting in the best 
 
 109. See id. at 509. 
 110. See Dickler, supra note 90, at 363–64; Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1042. 
 111. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[L]ower courts have not often applied the ‘rights of others’ prong from 
Tinker.”). But see Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177–83 (9th Cir. 
2006) (explicitly refusing to rely on the substantial disruption standard and holding that 
schools may restrict student speech that undermines another student’s “right to learn”), 
vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).  For an argument that off-campus student speech 
cases may be resolved based on analysis under Tinker’s “rights of others” prong, see Boyd, 
supra note 43, at 1237–40. 
 112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 113. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 114. See Fronk, supra note 43, at 1420 (“[T]he Court did not define how or when its 
[substantial disruption] test would be met . . . .”). 
 115. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 405 (noting that lower court decisions “do not 
identify how a court should determine whether there is a ‘substantial disruption’ beyond 
almost meaningless general statements”); Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1065 (observing that 
the lower courts are “all over the map” in applying Tinker’s requirement that the expression 
cause a substantial disruption). 
 116. See Samantha M. Levin, Note, School Districts As Weathermen:  The School’s 
Ability To Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment From 
Students’ Online Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 861 (2011) (arguing that Tinker 
established a vague standard for reasonably predicting substantial disruption and that “courts 
are unclear as to when the test should apply and how much discretion should be given to a 
school official’s decision to discipline”). 
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interests of the students and school.117  First, this section looks at a trilogy 
of decisions—Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,118 Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,119 and Morse v. Frederick120—where the 
Court carved out exceptions to the Tinker standard for student speech.  
Then, this section addresses Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County 
Board of Education,121 where the Court considered the issue of school 
liability for student-on-student sexual harassment. 
1.  Lewd and Vulgar Speech:  The Fraser Standard 
Tinker stood as the lone Supreme Court decision concerning student 
speech until the Fraser decision.122  In Fraser, the Court arguably 
eschewed conducting the substantial disruption test and established its first 
exception to Tinker.123  Rather than champion the rights of students as the 
majority had in Tinker, the Fraser Court embraced a position closer to 
Justice Black’s dissent.124  The Fraser Court granted considerable 
deference to school officials in carrying out the school’s basic educational 
mission and promoting “socially appropriate behavior.”125 
At a school assembly where 600 other students were present, Matthew 
Fraser gave a speech that employed a sexual metaphor and suggestive 
innuendos when nominating a classmate for elective office.126  Some 
students in the audience responded to Fraser’s speech with hoots and 
hollers, while others “graphically simulated” the activities to which Fraser’s 
speech alluded.127  The following day, one teacher reported that she had to 
devote part of her lecture to discussing Fraser’s speech with her class.128  
The school subsequently suspended Fraser for violating school policy 
prohibiting “obscene” conduct and removed him from consideration for 
 
 117. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, What’s Left of Tinker?, supra note 29, at 535–39 (arguing 
that the Supreme Court has become more deferential to school officials in student-speech 
cases). 
 118. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 119. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 120. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 121. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 122. In the interim, the Supreme Court did decide another case bearing on the 
constitutional rights of students. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) 
(holding that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, may justify a school’s search of a 
student’s bag). 
 123. See Dickler, supra note 90, at 364–65 (arguing that “Fraser . . . creat[ed] an 
exception to Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ test for student speech that is lewd, vulgar, 
indecent, or ‘plainly offensive,’” and noting that “the Fraser Court failed to require the 
school to present evidence that the speech had in fact caused a disruption as required by 
Tinker”). 
 124. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 125. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
 126. See id. at 677–78.  An excerpt of Fraser’s speech is indicative of its nature and 
theme:  “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his 
character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.” Id. at 
687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. at 678. 
 128. See id. 
2014] TINKER GONE VIRAL 3411 
graduation speaker.129  Fraser then alleged a violation of his First 
Amendment rights.130 
The Court distinguished the instant case from Tinker on the grounds that 
the former involved “sexual content” while the latter involved a political 
“message.”131  Upholding Fraser’s suspension, the Court held that a school 
may restrict vulgar or lewd student speech.132  As Justice Thurgood 
Marshall noted in a dissenting opinion, the Fraser Court deviated from 
Tinker by failing to conduct a proper substantial disruption analysis.133  
Instead, the Court grounded its analysis in the role of public schools as 
“inculcat[ors of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system.”134  Accordingly, the Fraser Court found it 
appropriate to grant school officials authority to prohibit student speech that 
was detrimental to the school’s “basic educational mission.”135  To this end, 
the Court granted school officials considerable deference to regulate student 
speech.136  Given that Fraser imbues school officials with significant power 
to regulate speech, it is generally understood by the Supreme Court, as well 
as lower courts, as not extending to off-campus student speech.137 
 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 679. 
 131. Id. at 680. 
 132. See id. at 685.  Thus, Fraser is an example of a content-based regulation of student 
speech. See Dickler, supra note 90, at 382; see also id. at 366 n.45 (arguing that the Fraser 
standard relaxes the general standard for content-based regulations). 
 133. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not 
conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker.”); Papandrea, supra note 
26, at 1048 (“[T]he Court’s analysis [in Fraser] was a dramatic deviation from the Court’s 
treatment of First Amendment rights generally and from Tinker specifically.”). 
 134. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)).  
For the Fraser Court, this role took on heightened significance in light of the young age of 
students in the audience. See id. at 683. 
 135. Id. at 685 (“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit 
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”).  Moreover, the 
Court found that it was the school’s prerogative to “disassociate” itself from speech not 
compatible with the fundamental values of public education. See id. at 685–86. 
 136. See id. at 683.  The Fraser Court expressly embraced the proposition that “the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings.” Id. at 682.  Indeed, “‘the First Amendment gives a high 
school student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.’” Id. 
(quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 
1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).  In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15–16, 18, 26 (1971). 
the Court held that the First Amendment protected the speech on the back of Paul Robert 
Cohen’s jacket, which read “Fuck the Draft,” notwithstanding the possibility that the speech 
might offend others. 
 137. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Had Fraser delivered the same 
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”); J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932–33 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(rejecting application of the Fraser standard to off-campus speech); Steve Varel, Note, 
Limits on School Disciplinary Authority over Online Student Speech, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
423, 440 (2013) (“[C]ourts and commentators generally agree that Fraser does not apply to 
off-campus speech.”). But see Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(suggesting uncertainty as to whether Fraser applies to off-campus speech and declining to 
decide the issue). 
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2.  School-Sponsored Speech:  The Kuhlmeier Standard 
In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court declined to apply either Tinker’s 
substantial disruption standard or Fraser’s exception for lewd and vulgar 
speech and instead established a new, separate test for school-sponsored 
expressive activities.138  The Court determined that school officials may 
regulate school-sponsored speech so long as such regulations bear a 
reasonable relationship to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”139  As it did 
in Fraser, the Court again gave considerable deference to school officials in 
making this determination.140 
In Kuhlmeier, Robert Reynolds, the principal of Hazelwood East High 
School, objected to two articles authored and submitted by students for 
publication in the school newspaper.141  Reynolds opposed publishing the 
articles, one about teen pregnancy and the other about the impact of divorce 
on children, on several grounds.142  Reynolds elected to delete the two 
pages of the newspaper on which the articles would have appeared and to 
print the remainder of the issue.143  Three student staff members 
subsequently brought suit alleging a violation of their First Amendment 
rights.144 
The Kuhlmeier Court viewed the issue, which it framed as whether the 
First Amendment required a school “affirmatively to promote particular 
student speech,” as analytically distinct from the issue in Tinker.145  
Whereas Tinker addressed student expression that simply happened to take 
place on school premises, the Court reasoned that the student speech at 
issue in Kuhlmeier was essentially curricular in nature.146  In the curricular 
context, the Court found that schools are entitled to exercise greater control 
over student expression to ensure that students learn the intended academic 
lessons and that educational content and materials are age appropriate.147  
Moreover, as in Fraser, the Court recognized a school’s interest in 
disassociating itself from student speech that would cause substantial 
 
 138. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988) (“[T]he standard 
articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not 
also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and 
resources to the dissemination of student expression.”); see also Dickler, supra note 90, at 
367 (describing Kuhlmeier as “yet another exception to Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ 
test”). 
 139. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273. 
 140. See id. (“[T]he education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of 
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”). 
 141. See id. at 263.  Established practice dictated that the journalism teacher would 
submit page proofs to Reynolds for his review prior to publication of each issue. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 264. 
 144. See id. at 262, 264. 
 145. Id. at 270–71.  In contrast, the Kuhlmeier Court viewed the inquiry in Tinker as 
whether the first Amendment required schools to “tolerate” student speech. Id. at 270. 
 146. See id. at 271.  The Court was persuaded that the students’ speech was curricular, 
because it was supervised and designed to impart particular skills to participating students. 
See id. 
 147. See id. 
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disruption, fail to meet minimum standards of quality, or otherwise interfere 
with a school’s educational mission.148  Accordingly, the Kuhlmeier Court 
held that school officials have the authority to restrict student speech in 
school-sponsored activities, provided that the regulations are reasonably 
related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”149 
3.  Advocacy of Illegal Drugs:  The Morse Standard 
In Morse, the Supreme Court, in its most recent ruling on student speech, 
established a third exception to Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.150  
As a preliminary matter, the Court avoided an opportunity to rule 
definitively on a school’s off-campus regulatory authority.151  Further, in 
reliance on Tinker’s special notion of the school environment and the state’s 
interest in deterring student drug use, the Court held that school officials 
may restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as encouraging 
illegal drug use.152  The Court’s ruling in Morse further demonstrated its 
shift toward greater deference to school officials when evaluating 
regulations of student speech.153 
In January 2002, the day the Olympic Torch Relay passed through 
Juneau, Alaska, Deborah Morse, the principal of Juneau-Douglas High 
School, permitted staff and students to attend the event as an approved 
social event or class trip.154  The relay was to take place during school 
hours and along a street in front of the school.155  The school permitted 
students to leave class and observe the relay from either side of the street, 
and teachers and administrative officials monitored the students.156  As 
torchbearers and camera crews passed by, Joseph Frederick, a high school 
senior, and his friends held up a fourteen-foot banner.157  Clearly visible to 
students across the street, the banner bore the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS.”158  Believing that the banner encouraged illegal drug use, Morse 
immediately demanded that it be taken down; she then confiscated it and 
 
 148. See id. at 271–72.  For an argument that the Kuhlmeier Court broadened Fraser’s 
“educational mission” language by taking it out of context, see Dickler, supra note 90, at 
368. 
 149. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
 150. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“[T]he mode of analysis set forth 
in Tinker is not absolute.”); see also Goldman, supra note 24, at 404 (stating that courts view 
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as “exceptions to Tinker’s general rule”). 
 151. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01 (finding that a student who attended a school-
approved event away from school property nevertheless could not claim that he was “not at 
school,” and finding further that he was subject to school regulatory authority (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
 152. See id. at 408. 
 153. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 401; Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1030. 
 154. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
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suspended Frederick for ten days.159  Frederick then filed suit, alleging that 
the school had violated his First Amendment rights.160 
The Court first found that Frederick’s case was a “school speech case,” 
notwithstanding the fact that the expression in question did not actually 
occur on school grounds.161  Noting that there “is some uncertainty at the 
outer boundaries” with respect to when courts should apply school-speech 
precedents, the Morse Court found its student-speech jurisprudence 
applicable because Frederick was standing among fellow students, during 
normal school hours, at an event sanctioned and monitored by school 
officials.162  Under such circumstances, the Court found that Frederick 
could not claim that his speech was completely off campus and therefore 
protected.163 
Starting from the proposition, well-established in its jurisprudence, that 
students at school do not enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults in 
other settings,164 the Court analyzed the school’s interest in banning 
Frederick’s speech.  The Court recognized that deterring drug use by 
schoolchildren is an important—“‘perhaps compelling’”—state interest.165  
Thus, student speech encouraging illegal drug use at a school event 
inherently conflicts with school officials’ duty to protect students “entrusted 
to their care” from the dangers of drug abuse.166  Accordingly, the Court 
held that school officials are permitted to restrict student expression that 
they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.167 
4.  A New School Duty:   
Preventing Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment 
In Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that a school could be held liable for 
its deliberate indifference to one student’s sexual harassment of another on 
school premises.168  Thus, under certain conditions, Davis imposes a duty 
on schools to prevent student-on-student sexual harassment.169  Davis, 
however, did not arise in the school-speech context, but rather in the 
 
 159. See id. at 398. 
 160. See id. at 399. 
 161. See id. at 400–01. 
 162. Id. at 401. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. at 406–07 (collecting Supreme Court cases discussing the nature of students’ 
constitutional rights in school). 
 165. Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).  
Moreover, the Court found it significant that Congress “has declared that part of a school’s 
job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use” and has provided substantial 
funding for drug-prevention programs. Id. at 408. 
 166. Id.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito emphasized the narrow scope of 
the Morse decision but also argued that, because parents cannot physically protect their 
children during school hours, school officials must have greater authority to intervene before 
speech causes violence among students. See id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 167. See id. at 408. 
 168. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 
(1999). 
 169. See id. 
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statutory context of Title IX.170  Nevertheless, Davis has important 
implications for a school’s regulatory role, including the realm of off-
campus student speech.171 
Over several months, LaShonda, a fifth-grade student, allegedly 
experienced repeated incidents of harassment by G.F., a classmate.172  
Although LaShonda contended that she reported G.F.’s abuse to several 
school officials, the administration purportedly took no disciplinary 
action.173  As a consequence of enduring G.F.’s harassment, LaShonda 
allegedly became depressed, and her academic performance suffered.174  
Ultimately, G.F. was charged with and pleaded guilty to sexual battery for 
his misconduct, and LaShonda’s mother sued the school for failing to take 
any action.175 
Relying on Title IX, the Davis Court articulated a test for when a school 
may be held liable for peer-to-peer harassment.176  First, a school must have 
had adequate notice of its potential liability for a student’s harassing 
conduct.177  Second, the school must have acted with “deliberate 
indifference” toward incidents of harassment.178  Third, the school must 
exercise some control over both the individual harasser and the context 
where harassment occurs.179  Finally, a reviewing court must find the 
harassment to be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it 
effectively deprives the victim of access to the educational opportunities or 
benefits provided by the school.180 
Accordingly, because it imposes liability on schools for inaction in the 
face of student-on-student harassment, the Davis standard is a difficult 
burden for plaintiffs to meet.181  Given this high bar, no court has yet 
addressed whether a school can be held liable under Davis for harassment 
that takes the form of digital speech.182  Nevertheless, the Davis decision, 
like Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, signals that the Court, in the wake of 
 
 170. Title IX provides, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a) (2012). 
 171. See Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages:  Does Title IX or the First 
Amendment Apply?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 905 (2001) (considering whether schools may be held 
liable under Title IX for online harassment among students). 
 172. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633–35 (summarizing harassment, which included sexual 
comments and physical contact). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 634. 
 175. See id. at 633–35. 
 176. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1095. 
 177. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643–44. 
 178. See id. at 644–45. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 650. 
 181. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1095–96 (arguing that, in Davis, “[t]he Court made 
clear that [a] school could be held liable [for student-on-student harassment] only in the most 
extreme circumstances”). 
 182. See id. 
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Tinker, has come to view schools as having increased authority and 
responsibility to regulate student conduct.183 
D.  Where Is the Line?   
Distinguishing Off-Campus and On-Campus Speech 
The Supreme Court student-speech precedent comes from events that 
either take place on school property or that are sponsored by the school.184  
Consequently, the Court has not had the opportunity to provide much 
guidance on the concept of off-campus student speech.185  With the rise of 
the internet and telecommunications technology, however, schools today 
have an increasing interest in regulating speech by students that takes place 
outside the school setting.186  This section first looks at the territorial 
approach that courts have taken when analyzing school regulations of off-
campus student speech.  This section then discusses the difficulty in 
applying this approach to student speech that takes place in the age of 
digital speech. 
1.  The Geographical Approach to Regulating Student Speech 
The Tinker Court justified school officials’ authority to regulate student 
speech, at least in part, based on the “special characteristics of the school 
environment.”187  In its subsequent student-speech jurisprudence, the Court 
reinforced its reliance on territorial boundaries, lest school regulatory 
authority exceed constitutional limits.188  In the context of nondigital 
speech, schools nevertheless have had occasion to contemplate regulating 
speech by students that occurs in the off-campus setting.189  Generally 
concluding that school authority to regulate student speech under Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse is geographically limited, lower courts have instead 
considered the propriety of applying Tinker’s substantial disruption 
 
 183. See supra Part I.C.1–3. 
 184. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 185. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the applicability of its school speech cases to 
speech originating off campus . . . .”). 
 186. See Sengupta, supra note 24. 
 187. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 188. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405–06 (2007) (“Kuhlmeier acknowledged 
that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though the government could not censor 
similar speech outside the school.’” (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 266 (1988))); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (“If respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, 
he could not have been penalized.”); see also Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1090 (“[M]any 
courts facing a student speech case ask as a threshold matter whether the speech can be 
considered on-campus or off-campus expression”). But see Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., 
concurring) (“[T]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of 
[school officials’] authority.”). 
 189. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828–29 (7th Cir. 1998); Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045–46; 
see also infra notes 191, 199–200 and accompanying text. 
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standard to analyze the constitutionality of school regulations of off-campus 
student speech.190  In doing so, lower courts have not abandoned the 
concept of territoriality, but rather, have considered it with differing levels 
of nuance. 
Several courts, for example, have found that Tinker is not implicated 
when reviewing a school’s regulation of speech that originates beyond 
school premises and control.191  In Thomas v. Board of Education, 
Granville Central School District,192 the Second Circuit declined to apply 
the Tinker standard to off-campus speech and refused to uphold a school’s 
decision to suspend students who created and distributed a satirical 
publication off campus.193  Although the newspaper did reach school 
property, the court found that any on-campus student activity related to the 
publication was “de minimis.”194  The Thomas court concluded that 
Tinker’s significant grant of regulatory authority to school officials was 
conditioned on its territorial limit.195  Under the traditional First 
Amendment standard, the court held that the school had exceeded its 
authority in suspending the students.196 
Other courts have applied Tinker’s substantial disruption standard to 
school regulations of speech that originated off campus but subsequently 
arrived on campus.197  Courts have, however, taken different approaches by 
considering the identity of the individual who brings the speech to 
campus.198  The Ninth Circuit, for example, found that Tinker authorized 
regulation of a student’s violent poem written off campus but subsequently 
brought on school premises by the author.199  The Seventh Circuit, 
meanwhile, applied the Tinker standard to evaluate a school’s decision to 
expel a student who wrote an article published in an “underground” 
newspaper that described how to hack school computers and that 
 
 190. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 405. 
 191. See, e.g., Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050–51; Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 
1986) (rejecting application of Tinker to uphold a school’s suspension of a student who 
raised his middle finger at a teacher while off campus). But see Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. 
Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837–38 (N.D. Miss. 2012) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court in Tinker 
specifically ruled that off-campus conduct causing material or substantial disruption at 
school can be regulated by the school.”); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 
711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he geographic origin of the speech is not 
material; Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech.”). 
 192. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1043. 
 193. See id. at 1050–51. 
 194. Id. at 1050. 
 195. See id. at 1052 (“[O]ur willingness to grant school officials substantial autonomy 
within their academic domain rests in part on the confinement of that power within the metes 
and bounds of the school itself.”). 
 196. See id. at 1045. 
 197. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. 
Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 
F. Supp. 2d 446, 454–55 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 198. See, e.g., LaVine, 257 F.3d at 984; Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829. 
 199. See LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989; see also infra note 311 (discussing LaVine).  Moreover, 
the LaVine court found that the school’s forecast of a substantial disruption was reasonable 
and upheld the student’s expulsion. See LaVine, 257 F.3d at 992. 
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subsequently was brought to campus by a third party.200  Alternatively, 
other courts, also confronting instances of off-campus speech that arrived 
on campus via persons other than the speaker, have declined to apply 
Tinker, instead analyzing regulations of such speech by considering 
whether the speech at issue constituted a “true threat.”201 
Thus, with respect to more traditional forms of student speech that 
originate outside of school, lower courts have tended to adhere to the 
dichotomy between off-campus and on-campus speech when analyzing 
Tinker’s applicability.202  Although they have developed different fact-
dependent standards for determining whether student speech technically 
occurs on or off campus,203 many courts, until recently, have declined to 
extend school regulatory authority under Tinker to student speech deemed 
to be off campus.204 
2.  Here, There, Everywhere:   
The Challenge of Geography in the Digital Age 
The increasingly easy transmission and accessibility of digital speech 
pose significant problems for the territory-based approach to school 
regulation of student speech under Tinker.205  In early cases involving 
digital student speech, courts sought to maintain the dichotomy.206  Indeed, 
under the Supreme Court’s student-speech jurisprudence, schools arguably 
already possess authority to regulate digital speech that is either created or 
 
 200. See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 821, 829; see also Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 448, 455 
(applying Tinker to a school’s decision to suspend a student who created a “top ten” list off 
campus that was later brought to campus by a third party and concluding that the student’s 
suspension was unconstitutional in the absence of a substantial disruption). 
 201. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–27 (8th Cir. 
2002) (en banc); see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–18 (5th 
Cir. 2004).  The First Amendment does not protect “true threats” of violence. See Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).  To constitute a true threat, the speaker must first 
intentionally or knowingly communicate the purported threat to either the object of the threat 
or a third person. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 616–17.  Courts have generally adopted an 
objective test that evaluates whether a reasonable person would interpret the alleged threat as 
a serious expression of the speaker’s intent to cause present or future harm. See Pulaksi, 306 
F.3d at 622.  Courts, however, are divided on the issue of the proper viewpoint from which 
to interpret the statement. See id. (observing that some courts evaluate the “reasonable 
person” standard from the speaker’s perspective while others evaluate it from the recipient’s 
perspective). 
 202. See supra notes 191–200 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 204. See, e.g., supra notes 195, 201 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1090 (arguing that application of a territorial 
approach to digital speech is problematic). 
 206. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(rejecting a school’s authority to suspend a student who created an offensive website because 
none of the conduct related to creating the website occurred on school property).  For a 
thorough review of lower courts’ geographical approach to early cases involving digital 
student speech, see Benjamin F. Heidlage, Note, A Relational Approach to Schools’ 
Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 580–83 (2009). 
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accessed by students while on campus.207  This approach necessarily cabins 
school regulatory authority to its territorial and temporal boundaries. 
Yet, as technology continues to proliferate and to facilitate 
communication, some courts have taken the position that rigid adherence to 
the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy is unwise, if not untenable.208  
Unlike traditional modes of expression, digital speech is uniquely pervasive 
and accessible.209  Therefore, determining where digital speech “takes 
place” for purposes of school regulations can be an arbitrary exercise.210  
Further, digital speech is easily circulated among students and, 
significantly, creates a record.211  The communication enabled by modern 
technology, moreover, is an integral aspect of life among America’s 
youth.212  In the interests of student safety and security, schools 
increasingly seek to justify surveillance of, and discipline for, objectionable 
student digital speech.213  As the reality of digital speech has challenged the 
continued viability of the on-campus/off-campus distinction and schools 
have become more aggressive in their regulatory approach, lower courts 
have confronted the issues of whether and when schools may reach student 
speech that previously would likely have been off-limits.214 
 
 
 207. See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment:  Censorship of the 
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 266 (2001) (arguing that 
schools may properly punish student expression “only when a student [creates or] ‘brings’ 
his . . . off-campus Web site to school”). 
 208. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220–21 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“[W]ireless internet access, smart phones, 
tablet computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-of-consciousness 
communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to speech that makes any effort to trace 
First Amendment boundaries along the physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for 
serious problems in our public schools.”). 
 209. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1090. 
 210. See id. at 1090–91; see also David R. Johnson & David Post, Law And Borders—
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996) (“Cyberspace radically 
undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) phenomena and physical 
location.”). 
 211. See Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“[O]utside of the official school environment, students are instant messaging, texting, 
emailing, Twittering, Tumblring, and otherwise communicating electronically . . . .”). 
 212. See Heidlage, supra note 206, at 589 (“There is no real separation between the way 
youths approach interactions through traditional methods of communication (including face-
to-face) and those that occur through Internet technology.”); see also Fronk, supra note 43, 
at 1438 (“[T]he current forms of digital expression that occur . . . are no different from the 
protected speech that occurs at malls, movie theaters, or other public venues where students 
congregate.”). 
 213. See Sengupta, supra note 24; see also Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1064 (noting that off-
campus electronic communications among students may sometimes concern “subjects that 
threaten the safety of the school environment”). 
 214. See infra Part II. 
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II.  UNCERTAINTY AT THE OUTER BOUNDARIES:  DIFFERING APPROACHES 
AMONG CIRCUIT COURTS TO OFF-CAMPUS DIGITAL STUDENT SPEECH 
There is a split among the federal courts of appeals with respect to 
whether, and under what circumstances, Tinker extends to off-campus 
student speech.  This Part considers the different modes of analysis 
employed by the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.  This Part first 
examines the Second Circuit’s test, which asks whether it is reasonably 
foreseeable that a student’s off-campus speech will reach school 
premises.215  Next, this Part looks at the Third Circuit’s approach, which 
does not involve a preliminary inquiry.216  This Part then addresses the 
Fourth Circuit’s test, which considers whether off-campus student speech 
has a sufficiently strong connection to a school’s pedagogical interests.217  
Finally, this Part describes the Ninth Circuit’s test, under which Tinker is 
implicated if off-campus student speech presents an identifiable threat of 
school violence.218 
A.  The Second Circuit Standard:   
Reasonable Foreseeability of Speech Reaching School Property 
In Doninger v. Niehoff,219 the school disciplined a student named Avery 
Doninger for writing a blog post containing vulgar language about the 
supposed cancellation of a school event.220  In light of the off-campus 
nature of Avery’s speech, the Second Circuit employed the threshold test 
developed in Wisniewski v. Board of Education.221  Applying this test, 
which asks whether it is reasonably foreseeable that off-campus student 
speech will reach school property, the Doninger court focused on the 
content of Avery’s speech and her expressive intent.222  The court rejected 
territoriality as an express limit on school regulatory authority.223 
As a high school junior and student council member, Avery became 
involved in a dispute with the school administration about scheduling a 
music event at the school.224  To garner attention, Avery and three other 
student council members sent, from the school’s computer lab, an email to 
students and parents encouraging them to contact Pamela Schwartz, the 
district superintendent.225  Schwartz and the school’s principal subsequently 
received an influx of concerned calls and emails, prompting the principal to 
cancel her planned training day away from her office.226  Avery then, from 
 
 215. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 216. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (assuming Tinker’s applicability). 
 217. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 218. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069. 
 219. 527 F.3d 41. 
 220. See id. at 43. 
 221. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 222. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
 223. See id. at 48–49. 
 224. See id. at 44. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See id. 
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home, posted a message on her publicly accessible blog claiming that 
“douchebags in central office” had canceled the music event and 
encouraging people to call Schwartz to “piss her off.”227  When the 
principal later learned about the blog post, she disciplined Avery by 
disqualifying her from running for senior class secretary.228  Avery’s 
mother subsequently brought an action on her behalf, alleging violations of 
Avery’s First Amendment rights.229 
Because Avery’s blog post occurred in an off-campus setting, the Second 
Circuit applied the threshold test established in Wisniewski.230  In 
evaluating whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s blog post 
would reach school property, the court considered several factors.231  First, 
the content of Avery’s speech—the purportedly canceled music event and 
her frustration with the school administration—directly pertained to school 
matters.232  Second, the court found that Avery knew her classmates would 
likely view her blog post, presumably because of its content and public 
nature.233  Third, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding 
that it was Avery’s specific intent to encourage her classmates to read and 
respond to her blog post, and that, in fact, several classmates did so.234  
Thus, on the basis of the content of the blog post, as well as Avery’s intent 
for it to reach campus, the Second Circuit held that Avery’s speech satisfied 
the threshold inquiry.235 
Having established that it was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s 
speech would reach school property, the court proceeded to apply Tinker’s 
substantial disruption standard.  As an initial matter, the court determined 
 
 227. Id. at 45.  Additionally, one student posted a comment to Avery’s blog that referred 
to Schwartz as a “dirty whore.” Id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. at 46–47. 
 230. In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit considered whether a school district violated 
Aaron Wisniewski’s First Amendment rights by suspending him for creating and using an 
AOL Instant Messaging icon on his parents’ home computer. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 
494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).  The icon consisted of a small drawing of a pistol firing a 
bullet at a person’s head, with dots above representing splattered blood and, below, the 
words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” Aaron’s English teacher. Id. at 36.  Aaron sent messages 
displaying the icon to several classmates, one of whom informed VanderMolen of the icon. 
See id.  The school suspended Aaron first for five days, then for one semester. See id. at 36–
37.  The Second Circuit concluded that the off-campus nature of Aaron’s speech did not 
necessarily “insulate” him from school regulation. Id. at 39.  The court held that Tinker 
applied to off-campus speech where it is reasonably foreseeable both that the speech will 
reach school authorities and that the speech will create a risk of substantial disruption within 
the school environment. See id. at 39–40. 
 231. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.  The court appeared to view the questions of whether it 
was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s speech would “come to the attention of school 
authorities” and whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s speech would “reach 
school property” as one and the same. See id.  For a critique of the Doninger court’s 
formulation of its test as excessively broad, see Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student 
Speech:  Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113, 1128 (2010). 
 232. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. 
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that the “plainly offensive” language Avery used in her blog post indicated 
a risk of disruption.236  Arguably more persuasive to the court was the fact 
that Avery’s blog post contained either misleading or false information 
regarding cancellation of the music event.237  Such misinformation was 
likely to prompt the school to respond, further disrupting operations.238  
Finally, the court determined that the discipline imposed, which was limited 
to Avery’s extracurricular opportunities, was appropriate.239  Thus, under 
Tinker, Avery’s speech created a foreseeable risk of substantial 
disruption.240  Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that Avery failed to 
show that the discipline imposed by the school violated her First 
Amendment rights.241 
B.  The Third Circuit Approach 
In June 2011, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, issued two decisions 
regarding school discipline for off-campus student speech:  J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District242 and Layshock ex rel. Layshock 
v. Hermitage School District.243  This section first examines the majority 
opinion in Snyder, which did not utilize or propose a threshold test for 
applying Tinker to off-campus student speech, but did indicate that the 
speaker’s intent bore significantly on its analysis.244  This section then 
looks at a separate concurrence in which five judges asserted that, under 




 236. Id. at 50–51.  In light of the vulgar speech at issue, the court contemplated whether 
to apply the Fraser standard as well. See id. at 49–50.  The Second Circuit noted that 
Avery’s blog post contained the sort of language that, under Fraser, schools may prohibit, 
but observed that Fraser does not clearly apply to off-campus speech, and, ultimately, 
declined to decide the issue. See id. 
 237. See id. at 51. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. at 52–53. 
 240. See id. at 53. 
 241. See id.  The Eighth Circuit has also extended Tinker by applying a threshold test 
similar to the Second Circuit’s. See S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 
696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) (reversing the district court’s order of a preliminary injunction 
in favor of the plaintiffs, who were suspended by the school district for creating and sharing 
with several classmates a website containing racist and sexually disparaging references to 
other classmates, because it was reasonably foreseeable that (1) the plaintiffs’ speech would 
reach the school environment and (2) the speech would create a substantial disruption); 
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying same 
analysis).  The Eighth Circuit has also held that schools may prohibit violent off-campus 
student speech that presents a “true threat.” See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 242. 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 243. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 244. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930. 
 245. See id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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1.  The Snyder Majority Opinion 
Like the Second Circuit in Doninger, the Third Circuit in Snyder 
confronted a contested suspension regarding a student’s objectionable 
speech about school officials.246  Unlike the Doninger court,247 however, 
the Snyder majority did not use a threshold test to determine the 
applicability of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard to off-campus 
student speech.  Indeed, the Snyder majority had no reason to fashion such a 
rule because it simply assumed Tinker’s applicability.248  In considering the 
possibility of finding a substantial disruption in the off-campus context, 
however, the Snyder majority emphasized that the speaker’s intent would be 
an inquiry of primary significance.249  In the absence of an express showing 
that the speaker both meant for her speech to reach the school and be taken 
seriously, the Third Circuit indicated that school regulation of off-campus 
student speech would not likely be valid.250 
J.S., an eighth-grade honor roll student, created a fake profile of her 
principal on MySpace.251  The profile did not identify the principal by 
name, school, or location, however it did feature his official photograph, 
which J.S. had taken from the school district’s website.252  The profile 
derided the principal and his family and implied that he was a pedophile.253  
Although the profile initially was available to the public, J.S. made the 
profile “private” the day after she created it, thereby limiting access only to 
people whom she and her friend K.L. invited.254  Upon learning of the 
profile’s existence—and that J.S. had created it—from another student, the 
principal suspended J.S. for ten days.255  J.S. and her parents sued the 
school district, alleging a violation of J.S.’s First Amendment rights.256 
Assuming Tinker’s applicability,257 the Snyder majority found no record 
of a substantial disruption at the school despite the affront to the 
principal.258  Moreover, the court found no support for the conclusion that 
 
 246. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 247. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926; see also Recent Case, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 
1069–71 (2012) (criticizing the Snyder court for not deciding whether Tinker applied to off-
campus speech). 
 249. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. at 920. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. at 921.  J.S. and K.L. granted access to approximately twenty-two classmates. 
See id.  No student viewed the profile at school because the school district’s computers 
blocked access to MySpace. See id. 
 255. See id. at 921–22. 
 256. See id. at 920. 
 257. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928.  Additionally, the Snyder majority expressly found 
Fraser inapplicable to student use of “profane language outside the school, during non-
school hours.” Id. at 932. 
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the school could have reasonably anticipated a disruption.259  The Snyder 
majority distinguished the instant case from other off-campus student-
speech cases by focusing on the fact that J.S.’s speech did not “target[] the 
school.”260  J.S. created the profile as a joke, and the court found the profile 
too outrageous to be taken seriously.261  Moreover, the profile did not 
identify the principal by name and, because of school policy, no student 
could have viewed it from school computers.262  Furthermore, the Snyder 
majority emphasized that J.S. took affirmative steps to limit access to the 
profile.263  The court therefore concluded that J.S., unlike the student in 
Doninger, had not intended for the profile to reach the school’s property.264  
Thus, to demonstrate a substantial disruption in the context of off-campus 
student speech, it appears that a majority of the Third Circuit would require 
at least that a student direct her speech toward campus or otherwise 
manifest an intention that it reach school property.265 
2.  The Snyder Concurring Opinion 
In a concurring opinion joined by four others, Judge D. Brooks Smith 
wrote separately to address whether Tinker’s substantial disruption standard 
applies to off-campus speech, an issue the Snyder majority did not reach.266  
While acknowledging the divide among lower courts on this issue,267 Judge 
Smith departed from the Snyder majority as well as the Doninger court.  He 
assailed the proposition that Tinker applied to off-campus student speech 
and stated that such an application would have “ominous implications.”268  
Accordingly, Judge Smith would have held that student speech in the off-
campus context is entitled to the same protection under the First 
Amendment as speech by citizens in the community at large.269 
 
 259. See id. at 931. 
 260. Id. at 930–31. 
 261. See id. at 929. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See id. at 930. 
 264. See id.  The court even faulted the principal for exacerbating a potential disruption 
by requesting that another student bring a printed copy of the profile to the school. See id. at 
921, 931. 
 265. As one commentator has noted, “Although it is unclear whether the Second Circuit 
[in Doninger] relied on intent as a necessary factor in determining whether it is reasonably 
foreseeable that speech will cause a substantial disruption, the Third Circuit [in Snyder] 
explicitly looked at the student’s intent as a factor to be examined.” Boyd, supra note 43, at 
1225 (citation omitted). 
 266. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 267. See id. at 937. 
 268. Id. at 939. 
 269. See id. at 936.  Numerous commentators support Judge Smith’s position. See, e.g., 
Calvert, supra note 207, at 279 (“[O]ff-campus-created Web sites raise new issues and 
require new rules; they are not addressed either well or adequately by existing Supreme 
Court precedent, especially when a student does not ‘bring’ the site on campus.”); Goldman, 
supra note 24, at 430 (“When student speech occurs outside of school supervision, the 
speech should receive the same First Amendment protection as a non-student’s speech.”); 
Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1093 (“[T]he Tinker approach to student speech is ill-suited to 
deal with off-campus expression.”). 
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Instead, according to the Snyder concurrence, Tinker is best understood 
as applying to on-campus student speech only.270  Judge Smith noted that 
the Tinker Court grounded its decision in the “‘special characteristics of the 
school environment.’”271  For example, the need for control by school 
officials is implicated by the fact that students at school essentially 
constitute a captive audience.272  Extending Tinker to off-campus student 
speech, in Judge Smith’s view, would invite schools to regulate speech 
without regard to its time, place, manner, or content, so long as it entailed 
the possibility of causing a substantial disruption.273  Thus, the concurrence 
would have held that J.S.’s off-campus speech, although objectionable, was 
entitled to as much protection under the First Amendment as other 
ostensibly “worthless” speech in the marketplace of ideas.274 
C.  The Fourth Circuit Standard:   
Sufficient Nexus Between Speech and Pedagogical Interests 
In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,275 the school suspended Kara 
Kowalski for creating a webpage on MySpace devoted to disparaging a 
classmate.276  Before determining that Tinker applied to Kara’s off-campus 
speech, the Fourth Circuit implemented a threshold inquiry, asking whether 
there was a sufficient nexus between her speech and the school’s 
pedagogical interests.277  Unlike the Second Circuit’s reliance on 
foreseeability or the Third Circuit’s emphasis on intent, the Fourth Circuit 
grounded its inquiry in the school’s broad educational mission and duty to 
its students.278  Like the Second Circuit, however, the Fourth Circuit 
 
 270. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936–41 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 271. Id. at 937 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
 272. See id. at 937–38. 
 273. See id. at 939.  For example, Judge Smith hypothesized that if a student were to 
author a blog post defending gay marriage from his home, and if his classmates were to learn 
of the post and object to it, the school might reasonably forecast a substantial disruption at 
school and punish the student for his off-campus speech. See id. 
 274. See id. at 941.  Judge Smith, however, conceded that he would have “no difficulty” 
applying Tinker to a case where, for example, a student sent a disruptive email to a teacher 
or other school official from her home computer. Id. at 940.  Judge Smith based this retreat 
from his otherwise rigid position on Tinker’s limitations on his view that “[r]egardless of its 
place of origin, speech intentionally directed towards a school is properly considered on-
campus speech.” Id.  Thus, intentionality, which the Snyder majority contemplated and 
found lacking, also represented an essential consideration for the concurring judges. 
 275. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 276. See id. at 567. 
 277. See id. at 573; see also Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (noting that the Fourth Circuit “requires that the speech have a sufficient ‘nexus’ 
to the school” before applying Tinker to off-campus speech). 
 278. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 571–72.  Moreover, the court’s threshold test echoes 
language from the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First 
Amendment by exercising editorial control over . . . student speech . . . so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” (emphasis added)). 
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additionally considered whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Kara’s 
off-campus speech would reach the school environment.279 
On December 1, 2005, Kara, a high school senior, created a MySpace 
discussion with the heading “S.A.S.H.” from her home computer.280  She 
invited approximately one hundred people to join the group, and about two 
dozen of her classmates joined.281  Much of the commentary on the 
webpage ridiculed Shay, a classmate.282  One student uploaded several 
photographs to the webpage:  one of himself and a friend displaying a sign 
that read, “Shay Has Herpes,” and two others of Shay herself, to which he 
had added disparaging marks and signs.283  Numerous other students posted 
comments voicing their approval of the webpage and Kara, its creator.284  
The next day, Shay and her parents filed a harassment complaint with the 
school, and Shay did not attend class.285  The school suspended Kara for 
five days and prohibited her from participating in certain social and 
extracurricular events.286  Kara then sued the school district, alleging a 
violation of her First Amendment rights.287 
In contrast to the approaches taken by the Second and Third Circuits, the 
Fourth Circuit primarily focused on the “nexus” between Kara’s off-campus 
speech and the school’s pedagogical interests.288  Channeling Fraser, the 
Kowalski court grounded its analysis in the role of school officials as 
“trustees of the student body’s well-being” and the mission of schools as 
educators of fundamental values.289  Here, the pedagogical interest at issue 
was the school’s duty to provide a safe learning environment—one free 
from bullying.290  The court reasoned that regardless of where it originated, 
Kara’s speech interfered with the school’s interest in providing a safe 
learning environment.291  Therefore, Kara’s speech was sufficiently 
connected to one of the school’s pedagogical interests to justify application 
of Tinker.292 
 
 279. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574. 
 280. See id. at 567.  While Kara claimed that “S.A.S.H.” was an acronym for “Students 
Against Sluts Herpes,” a classmate stated that the acronym actually stood for “Students 
Against Shay’s Herpes,” referring to the student who was the main subject of discussion on 
the webpage. See id. 
 281. See id. at 568. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See id. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See id. 
 286. See id. at 569. 
 287. See id. at 570. 
 288. See id. at 573.  The court instructively phrased the issue as “whether [Kara’s] 
activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high school’s legitimate interest in 
maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and educational rights of its 
students.” Id. at 571. 
 289. Id. at 573. 
 290. See id. at 572. 
 291. See id. at 573–74. 
 292. See id. at 572–73. 
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The Kowalski court’s analysis also borrowed from, and appeared to 
conflate, the Second Circuit’s approach in Doninger.293  In addition to its 
“sufficient nexus” analysis, the court indicated that applying Tinker was 
proper because Kara knew, or could reasonably have expected, that her off-
campus speech would ultimately reach the school or otherwise impact the 
school environment.294  Given the webpage’s name and the fact that a 
majority of its members were classmates of Kara and Shay, the court noted 
that Kara could anticipate that Shay would view the attack as having been 
made in the school context.295 
Thus, the court concluded that Tinker should apply because Kara’s off-
campus speech had a sufficiently strong nexus to a legitimate pedagogical 
interest and because it was reasonably foreseeable that her speech would 
reach the school.296  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that Kara’s speech would create a substantial 
disruption at school, and that, therefore, the school’s punishment did not 
infringe on her First Amendment rights.297 
D.  The Ninth Circuit Standard:   
Speech Presenting An Identifiable Threat of School Violence 
In Wynar v. Douglas County School District,298 the school suspended 
Landon Wynar for sending instant messages to classmates that threatened a 
school shooting.299  The Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to adopt either the 
Second or Fourth Circuit standard, instead holding that Tinker applied to 
off-campus student speech that presented an “identifiable threat of school 
violence.”300  Like the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the 
school’s interest in, and duty to provide for, student safety.301  As 
demonstrated by the Wynar court’s references to Columbine, Sandy Hook, 
and other school shootings,302 however, the standard it articulated is 
premised more on physical security and the school’s custodial role. 
Landon regularly exchanged instant messages with friends on 
MySpace.303  Over several months during Landon’s sophomore year, his 
messages became increasingly violent and disturbing.304  To his friends, 
 
 293. See id. at 574 (“[I]t was foreseeable in this case that [Kara’s] conduct would reach 
the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices . . . .”); cf. Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]t was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s [blog] 
posting would reach school property.”). 
 294. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id. at 572–73. 
 297. See id. at 574 (finding that Kara’s conduct “created a reasonably foreseeable 
substantial disruption” at school). 
 298. 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 299. See id. at 1065–66. 
 300. Id. at 1069. 
 301. See id. at 1069–70. 
 302. See id. at 1069–70 & n.6. 
 303. See id. at 1065. 
 304. See id.  Landon’s messages contained references to his “sweet gun,” “500 rounds” of 
ammunition, his “hit list,” and his aspiration to “get” more than fifty people. Id. at 1065–66. 
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Landon appeared to be contemplating a school shooting to take place on 
April 20.305  Concerned, Landon’s friends eventually brought his messages 
to the attention of the principal, which, in turn, led to a police 
investigation.306  Although Landon claimed the messages were a joke, the 
school district suspended and then expelled him.307  Landon and his father 
sued the school district and its officials for violations of Landon’s First 
Amendment rights.308 
The Wynar court began its analysis by reviewing the threshold tests 
imposed by its sister courts, noting that off-campus student speech as a 
general matter resists a “global standard.”309  Declining to adopt either the 
Second or Fourth Circuit’s threshold standard, the court nevertheless 
indicated that Landon’s messages would readily satisfy either test.310  The 
court proceeded to revisit its decision in LaVine v. Blaine School 
District,311 holding that, “when faced with an identifiable threat of school 
violence,” schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus 
student speech that complies with the Tinker standard.312  Focused on 
school officials’ duty to provide a safe school environment and against the 
backdrop of mass shootings at Columbine and Sandy Hook, the Wynar 
court asserted that a school’s ability to protect its students from violence 
should not necessarily yield to a student’s First Amendment rights.313  
Thus, the court concluded that Landon’s messages constituted an 
identifiable threat of school violence and found that the Tinker standard was 
 
 305. See id. at 1065.  The court noted that April 20 is the date of Hitler’s birth and the 
Columbine massacre, as well as within days of the anniversary of a mass shooting at 
Virginia Tech. See id. 
 306. See id. at 1066. 
 307. See id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. Id. at 1069.  Nevertheless, the court distinguished speech such as that at issue in 
Snyder from Landon’s speech in the instant case. See id. (“A student’s profanity-laced 
parody of a principal is hardly the same as a threat of a school shooting . . . .”). 
 310. See id. at 1069. 
 311. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).  In LaVine, the Ninth Circuit held that a school did not 
violate the First Amendment rights of a student for expelling him on an emergency basis 
because of a first-person poem about a school shooting and suicide that the student wrote at 
home and later showed to a teacher during class. See id. at 988.  Applying the Tinker 
standard to the school’s actions, the court concluded that the school could have reasonably 
predicted a substantial disruption—“specifically, that [the student] was intending to inflict 
injury upon himself or others.” Id. at 990.  The Wynar court noted, with some 
disapprobation, that several other courts have interpreted LaVine as an example of a case 
applying Tinker to off-campus student speech. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068.  In Wynar, 
however, the Ninth Circuit asserted that it did not view LaVine as standing for the 
proposition that the geographic origin of student speech was immaterial. See id.  In contrast 
to the off-campus speech at issue in Wynar, which was brought to campus by someone other 
than the speaker, the court distinguished LaVine as a case dealing with “speech created off 
campus but brought to the school by the speaker.” Id.; see also supra note 199. 
 312. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069; see also C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, No. 
6:12–cv–1042–TC, 2013 WL 5102848, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2013) (“[O]ff-campus speech 
is within the reach of school officials.  When faced with an identifiable threat of school 
violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets 
the requirements of Tinker [sic].” (citation omitted)). 
 313. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069–70 & n.6. 
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appropriate.314  The Wynar court analyzed Landon’s speech under both the 
substantial disruption prong and the invasion of the rights of others 
prong.315 
Given the inflammatory nature of the threats in Landon’s messages, the 
court held that it was reasonable for the school to view them as a risk and to 
forecast a substantial disruption.316  The court noted that Landon had 
identified a possible date and described how he would kill several specific 
students.317  Moreover, because Landon had access to weapons and 
ammunition, both his friends and the school had reason to believe he had 
the ability to carry out a shooting.318  The Wynar court expressly rejected a 
comparison between Landon’s messages and the fake profile at issue in 
Snyder, which the Third Circuit had dismissed as too outrageous to be taken 
seriously.319 
The Wynar court also analyzed Landon’s messages under Tinker’s 
invasion of the rights of others prong, which it acknowledged was not a 
popular mode of analysis in other circuits.320  Without endeavoring to 
define the scope of the language, the court found that the threat of a school 
shooting undoubtedly constituted an invasion of the rights of others under 
Tinker.321  Indeed, the court concluded that Landon’s messages represented 
the “quintessential harm” to the rights of other students to be secure 
because they not only threatened the entire student body, but also targeted 
certain students by name.322 
III.  UPDATING TINKER:  A MODIFIED STANDARD FOR SCHOOL 
REGULATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
No consensus has emerged among the lower courts for how to approach 
the issue of school regulation of off-campus student speech.323  While 
similar in some aspects, the threshold tests developed by the Second, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits respond to different events, are guided by 
different principles, and, moreover, are likely to yield different results.  Part 
III of this Note compares the threshold tests, and, finding that they 
inadequately serve the rights and needs of students and schools, 
recommends an alternative.  Part III.A evaluates the Doninger, Kowalski, 
and Wynar tests for effectiveness and common elements.  Part III.B then 
proposes that courts address the issue by adopting a new definition of 
 
 314. See id. at 1069–70. 
 315. See id. at 1070–72. 
 316. See id. at 1070. 
 317. See id. at 1071. 
 318. See id. 
 319. See id. 
 320. See id. at 1071–72. 
 321. See id. at 1072. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See supra Part II; see also Barry P. McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 
MO. L. REV. 727, 737 (2012) (“[T]he courts’ positions . . . are currently in disarray.”). 
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“substantial disruption” for specific application to off-campus digital 
speech. 
A.  Grading the Circuit Tests 
This section compares the approaches taken by the Second, Third, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits to the issue of school regulation of off-campus 
student speech.  It argues that the courts’ approaches do not adequately 
protect student speech and fail to guide schools toward meaningful policies 
and enforcement.  This section then examines common elements and values 
underlying the threshold tests that have led courts to authorize school 
regulation of off-campus student speech in appropriate cases. 
 
1.  The Doninger Test 
The Doninger test, which predicates Tinker’s applicability to off-campus 
student speech on whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will 
reach school grounds or school officials,324 suffers from several 
weaknesses.  First, while the controversy before the court involved a 
student’s blog post, the Second Circuit did not unambiguously limit its test 
only to circumstances involving off-campus digital student speech.325  
Consequently, this approach entails a considerable risk of chilling protected 
speech.  Second, assuming that the court, in fact, did intend to fashion a 
threshold inquiry for exclusive application to off-campus digital speech, the 
Doninger test, as articulated, fails to define or otherwise qualify the content 
within its intended scope.  For example, to borrow Judge Smith’s 
hypothetical,326 if it is reasonably foreseeable that a student’s blog post 
defending—or repudiating—gay marriage would reach the school, and the 
Tinker substantial disruption standard could also be met or predicted, could 
the school lawfully take disciplinary action?  Because nothing in the court’s 
opinion precludes it from reaching such off-campus student political 
speech, the Doninger test seems overly broad.  Third, in the context of 
digital speech, the Doninger test fails to create a meaningful threshold.327  
In a modern culture where mobile phones, tablets, social networking 
websites, and other instruments of expression are ubiquitous, virtually any 
online or digital communication may foreseeably—if not inevitably—make 
its way to school premises.328  Thus, the Doninger test does not impose a 
 
 324. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 325. In light of Thomas, which hewed to the traditional on-campus/off-campus dichotomy 
for applying the Tinker standard and which the Second Circuit never expressly overruled, the 
Doninger court could more clearly have cabined the scope of its holding. See generally 
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 326. See supra note 273. 
 327. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1091–92. 
 328. See Boyd, supra note 43, at 1236 (“Almost all communication created through the 
Internet and other instant means can foreseeably make its way to a school campus and to the 
attention of school authorities due to the pervasive nature of electronic communication.”); 
Waldman, supra note 231, at 1128. 
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useful limit on the quality or quantity of digital speech that a school may 
ostensibly regulate. 
2. The Kowalski Test 
The Kowalski test, under which a school may reach off-campus speech 
that has a sufficiently strong nexus to the school’s pedagogical interests,329 
is also subject to criticism.  Like the Doninger test, the Kowalski test is 
articulated in quite broad terms.  Unlike the Doninger court, the Kowalski 
court was responding to an instance of cyberbullying.330  In granting 
considerable authority to school officials, the Kowalski test draws on the 
latter Supreme Court student-speech decisions, whose methodology is 
rooted in a school’s pedagogical interests and broad educational purpose.331 
The Kowalski court, however, declined to offer guidance on the types of 
pedagogical interests that would permit jurisdiction.332  Assuming that the 
provision of a safe learning environment is a sufficiently important school 
interest to justify discipline for off-campus student speech, the scope of the 
Kowalski test remains uncertain.  For example, would a school’s interest in 
shielding its faculty be sufficient?333  Or a school’s interest in preserving 
institutional integrity?334  Like the Doninger test, therefore, the Kowalski 
test is also potentially overbroad.335 
Moreover, the Kowalski court left unresolved the methodology for 
determining when or whether the nexus between off-campus student speech 
and a school’s pedagogical interests is “sufficiently strong.”336  If mere 
reasonable foreseeability that the speech could reach school property would 
establish a sufficient connection between off-campus student speech and 
pedagogical interests, then that standard is susceptible to the same criticism 
that the Doninger test warrants.337  If the court instead meant to establish 
another standard, then it failed to do so in an adequately clear manner. 
 
 
 329. See generally supra Part II.C. 
 330. See supra notes 280–83. 
 331. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011); see also 
supra note 278. 
 332. Indeed, while the structure of the Kowalski court’s opinion suggests that the 
pedagogical interest at stake was student health and safety (vis à vis freedom from bullying), 
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3.  The Wynar Test 
Compared to the Doninger and Kowalski tests, the Wynar test, which 
permits application of the Tinker standard to off-campus student speech that 
constitutes an identifiable threat of school violence,338 is arguably more 
speech protective.  Based on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
and the language of its test,339 it is unlikely, for example, that school 
discipline for the speech at issue in Doninger, which was only indecent and 
possibly inciting, would be tolerated under the Wynar test.  Responding to 
the danger of school shootings and resting on a school’s duty to protect 
student safety,340 the Wynar test focuses expressly on violence but does not 
offer a definition for the violence contemplated. 
Under Wynar, it is therefore unclear whether a school may regulate only 
a student’s threats of death or serious bodily harm, or if a school could 
reach instances of cyberbullying.341  If the Wynar test is intended to 
encompass only threats of serious bodily harm, it is uncertain why the line 
should arbitrarily be drawn there.  While a school shooting is an 
incomparable tragedy, cyberbullying is arguably a more common issue,342 
as the Kowalski court realized.  Moreover, the Wynar test arguably 
discounts the emotional value in “blowing off steam” and may therefore be 
overinclusive with respect to allegedly violent student threats.343  Finally, 
the Wynar test is ambiguous as to severity:  would one threat be enough, or 
must it be numerous threats made over an extended period of time? 
4.  Common Considerations and Theory 
Although the circuits deal with the problem of off-campus digital student 
speech by applying different tests, the threshold tests and their justifications 
reflect some common elements and concerns.  As a preliminary matter, the 
courts agree that the internet and the proliferation of digital speech 
challenge the continued viability of the traditionally geography-based 
regulation of student speech and expressive conduct.344  Thus, 
notwithstanding the differences in the threshold tests they established, each 
court—except for the Third Circuit, which simply assumed the matter—
expressly found that the Tinker standard was applicable to off-campus 
speech under certain circumstances.345 
 
 338. See generally supra Part II.D. 
 339. See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text; see also supra note 166 and 
accompanying text. 
 341. For example, the speech at issue in Kowalski was mean spirited and degrading, but 
arguably not threatening. See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 342. See Hoffman, supra note 7 (citing a study finding that cyberbullying affects one in 
five middle school students). 
 343. See Calvert, supra note 207, at 282 (noting the important function of speech as a 
passive method for venting frustration). 
 344. See generally supra Part II.A–B.1, II.C–D. 
 345. See supra notes 222, 248, 277, 300 and accompanying text; see also McDonald, 
supra note 323, at 736–37. 
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Moreover, each circuit court premised its test on a similar understanding 
of the Supreme Court’s entire student speech canon, as well as a common 
conception of the modern role of public schools.  Thus, they are wont to 
accept a limited vision of students’ constitutional rights and, based on the 
Court’s latter student-speech jurisprudence, expanded school regulatory 
authority.  For example, the Doninger and Kowalski courts arguably relied 
on Fraser and Kuhlmeier for the proposition that schools play an important 
role in teaching fundamental values.346  The Kowalski and Wynar tests, in 
particular, reflect and embrace a robust regulatory role for schools that is 
not inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent.347  The courts’ 
perceived need for a threshold test, however, indicates their continued 
rejection of plenary school regulatory authority. 
Further undergirding several opinions is the notion of intentionality—that 
is, whether the student intended her off-campus speech to reach school 
property or otherwise targeted the school in some meaningful way.348  As 
for other potential factors, their role in the analysis is less than clear.  Both 
Doninger and Kowalski involved student speech that reached numerous 
other students,349 which arguably may have influenced the courts to find 
Tinker applicable in those cases.  The role of a student’s age is also unclear, 
although it is worth noting that while the Doninger, Kowalski, and Wynar 
courts found that school discipline did not violate the Constitution in cases 
involving high school students,350 the Snyder court, considering a case 
concerning a middle school student, found the school’s discipline 
unconstitutional.351 
Significantly, however, the courts have not enunciated a clear or coherent 
definition of “substantial disruption” in the off-campus context.  In Snyder, 
the Third Circuit concluded that a mock profile disparaging a principal and 
his family did not rise to the level of substantial disruption.352  In 
Wisniewski and Doninger, however, the Second Circuit found that student 
speech against school faculty either did or might reasonably cause a 
substantial disruption,353 even though the contested speech in those cases 
was arguably less objectionable than that at issue in Snyder.  The Wynar 
court, meanwhile, was persuaded that a student’s violent instant messages 
constituted a potentially substantial disruption, notwithstanding the fact that 
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they were unaccompanied by any actual violence and were distributed only 
to several peers.354  The Kowalski court noted the ongoing nature of 
cyberbullying and found a substantial disruption where the victim of Kara’s 
abuse missed a day of school to avoid further humiliation.355 
B.  Redefining Substantial Disruption in the Off-Campus Context 
Given the inadequacies of the threshold tests applied in Doninger, 
Kowalski, and Wynar,356 this Note recommends addressing the issue of 
school regulation of off-campus student speech by redefining “substantial 
disruption” in this context.  It is evident that, even in the traditional context, 
whether student speech causes (or reasonably may be predicted to cause) a 
substantial disruption is a determination that has vexed courts.357  While the 
phrase’s vagueness provides courts with flexibility, it likely also contributes 
to the sensible concern that, without adequate safeguards, liberal extension 
of the Tinker standard may unduly encroach on constitutional rights. 
Accordingly, this Note proposes that, in the limited context of off-
campus digital student speech, courts define “substantial disruption” 
according to the parameters set forth by the Supreme Court in Davis in the 
Title IX context.358  That is, to be sufficient to justify school discipline 
under Tinker, a student’s off-campus speech must be sufficiently severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive to deprive another student (or students) 
of access to an educational opportunity or benefit.359  Redefining the 
substantial disruption standard in this context would abolish the need for 
vague threshold tests and instead protect both schools and students without 
unduly burdening free speech rights. 
Adapting the Davis approach to school regulation of off-campus student 
speech is consistent with the interests outlined above.360  First, it would 
serve a school’s interest in regulating appropriate cases of off-campus 
speech, eradicating the rigid geographical approach to Tinker that has 
become arbitrary and outmoded in the digital world.361  Second, by 
focusing only on speech that interferes with a student’s educational 
opportunities, it aligns with the broad educational mission of schools.  
Moreover, it is consistent with the protective role of schools that courts 
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have inferred from latter Supreme Court school-speech jurisprudence, and 
which schools have embraced in the interest of providing a safe learning 
environment.362  Thus, while establishing a high threshold for regulation, 
the Davis approach would not foreclose schools from responding to the 
modern reality of violence in schools.  Third, given its requirements of 
severity and pervasiveness, the Davis approach would not likely justify 
regulation in response to conduct that is merely accidental or incidental.  
Thus, the Davis approach would likely satisfy the intent evaluation that a 
reviewing court might conduct in the context of off-campus student 
speech.363  Finally, this approach has the advantage of introducing a 
consistent, predictable, and practicable standard without sacrificing judicial 
flexibility. 
Under the Davis approach to school regulation, the Wynar and Kowalski 
decisions would likely stand.  In Wynar, Landon’s violent messages over 
several months likely meet the requirements for severity, pervasiveness, and 
objective offensiveness.364  A closer question would be whether Landon’s 
speech effectively barred his classmates’ access to an educational 
opportunity.  However, threats of a school shooting that other students find 
so concerning that they feel compelled to notify school officials arguably 
distract those students from schoolwork and damage their sense of security 
at school.365  Similarly, in Kowalski, Kara’s derogatory webpage would 
likely satisfy the requirements of severity and objective offensiveness.366  
Arguably, a court could support a finding of pervasiveness based on the 
number of classmates Kara’s webpage reached.367  Moreover, because 
cyberbullying—like that at issue in Kowalski—may have devastating 
effects not only on a student’s academic performance, but also on her 
mental health,368 deprivation of an educational opportunity may be found in 
appropriate cases.  Meanwhile, the Davis approach would be unlikely to 
authorize the discipline imposed in Doninger and Snyder.  Because the 
student speech at issue in those cases concerned school faculty369—not 
fellow students—the likelihood of a lost educational opportunity is low. 
Critics of this approach are likely to contend that the Davis standard 
arose in a different context; there, the issue concerned potential school 
liability for inaction in the face of student-on-student harassment,370 
whereas, in the student-speech context, the issue is whether schools 
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lawfully may take voluntary disciplinary action.  Although the distinction 
between issues of liability and authority to regulate is not insignificant, the 
Davis opinion and the Supreme Court’s student-speech jurisprudence 
protect a similar interest:  ensuring a student’s ability to receive an 
education.371  Critics may also argue that adopting the Davis approach 
entails the risk of sweeping up too much speech.  Lower courts, however, 
have already determined that school regulation of off-campus student 
speech is appropriate in some cases and have done so under standards that 
are arguably more vague and less speech protective than the Davis approach 
proposed here.372  Finally, critics may claim that state civil and criminal 
laws currently provide sufficient remedies,373 and that school regulation of 
off-campus speech therefore is not only unconstitutional, but also 
unnecessary.  Developing state legislation may one day vindicate that 
argument, but today it is evident that state law does not cover all off-
campus student speech capable of affecting the school environment, 
therefore provoking school interest in regulation.374 
CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of the internet, wireless devices, and mobile phones has 
significantly altered the methods, forms, and venues of communication.  In 
the context of student speech, the effects of modern technology have been 
especially profound, because courts have generally sanctioned school 
regulatory authority on the basis of geography, granting considerable 
deference to school officials on campus, while protecting students’ 
constitutional rights off campus.  In the contemporary setting, where a 
student may cause significant harm to the school environment without 
setting foot on school premises, courts have molded different threshold tests 
to authorize school regulation of off-campus student speech under Tinker’s 
substantial disruption standard.  These tests, however, are inconsistent and 
arguably do not serve the rights and needs of students and schools. 
Failure to articulate a uniform test entails the risk of subjecting students 
to different school policies that may be either overly broad or restrictive 
with respect to their First Amendment and other rights.  Moreover, failure 
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to identify a clear and adequate standard risks ineffective enforcement of 
school policies promoting important pedagogical interests, such as ensuring 
meaningful educational opportunities and a safe school environment.  By 
redefining “substantial disruption” in accordance with the conception of 
harassment articulated in Davis in the Title IX context, courts might better 
serve schools’ regulatory interests while protecting students’ First 
Amendment rights. 
